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Abstract—We analyze the fundamental differences between
locational pricing and redispatch-based congestion management,
followed by an assessment of their effects on grid operation and
market efﬁciency. It is indicated that although optimal nodal
pricing and congestion redispatch can provide equal results in
terms of power injections, they are not equivalent in terms of
short-run social welfare. Moreover, a modeling framework is
presented to decouple and analyze the effects of transmission sys-
tem operator/regulator and prosumer behavior on energy market
efﬁciency in a transparent fashion. All results are illustrated on
the basis of case studies for the IEEE 39-bus New England test
network.
I. INTRODUCTION
Finite transmission-line capacity and a lack of power-
ﬂow controllability pose strict constraints on electrical power
transmission. Persistent violation of network constraints can
cause power outages with severe economical consequences.
Accordingly, congestion management is vital to guarantee
secure operation of the electricity grid.
Before liberalization of the electricity market, network
limitations could effectively be taken into account during the
dispatch phase, which was centrally coordinated and involved
a small number of cooperating parties only. At present,
power networks are deregulated and decentralized, and their
operation relies on providing market participants with proper
incentives for societal beneﬁcial behavior. When congestion
management is the main focus, transmission system operators
(TSOs) need to design arrangements that maximize market
performance while simultaneously motivating producers and
consumers to adapt to network restrictions. It is well-known
that transmission constraints can induce market inefﬁciency,
because congestion can supply participants with large market
power. To prevent this, market-based congestion management
should be robust, fair and transparent.
In Europe, two different congestion management schemes
can be distinguished, see, e.g., [1], [2]. Many TSOs correct
infeasible outcomes of an unconstrained forward market via
congestion redispatch, that is, by requesting counter trans-
actions after gate closure. As an alternative, some operators
employ locational marginal pricing (LMP) such as nodal or
zonal pricing to directly inﬂuence the energy market during
forward trade. Locational prices differ from the unconstrained-
market price (determined by the lowest-cost producers) if
congestion occurs, thus providing an incentive to schedule
generation and load in a way that contributes to grid security.
In this paper, we compare the principles and effects of
counter-trade and LMP-based congestion management on grid
operation and market performance, particularly in terms of
dispatch efﬁciency. Firstly, we indicate that only under par-
ticular conditions, both schemes can attain equal short-run
social welfare. Secondly, we present a multiobjective modeling
framework to decouple and analyze the effects of TSO and
prosumer behavior on short-run network security and dispatch
market efﬁciency. All results are illustrated using the widely-
used IEEE 39-bus New-England benchmark network.
Notation: R and Rn, n = 1, 2, . . ., denote the ﬁeld of real
numbers and real-valued n-dimensional vectors, respectively.
The operator col(·) stacks its operands into a column vector;
diag(·) denotes a square matrix with its operands on the main
diagonal and zeros elsewhere. Inequalities hold element-wise.
II. COMPETITIVE MARKETS FOR ELECTRICAL ENERGY
The main reason for deregulating the electricity market is to
increase its efﬁciency through competition. This implies min-
imization of the long-run production costs, establishment of
cost-reﬂective prices, while maximizing the sum of producer
proﬁt and consumer surplus (i.e., the social welfare), see, for
instance, [3]. Yet, apart from energy supply/demand, few other
aspects of the electrical power system lend themselves for
competitive operation. Transmission is particularly unsuited
for competition as a consequence of its natural monopoly
character: duplicated lines are a waste of capital equipment
and network expansion involves high investment costs. The
monitoring, maintenance and construction of the European
transmission system is therefore carried out by publicly-
regulated TSOs.
To optimize system efﬁciency, markets for the supply and
demand of electricity should be designed as competitive as
possible. In competitive markets, producers adjust price and
supply until the market reaches an equilibrium. Competitive
market equilibriums can be short-run and long-run optimal, as
deﬁned below (see [3] for more details).
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Deﬁnition II.1 A short-run/dispatch-efﬁcient market equilib-
rium is attained when marginal cost/beneﬁt equals the market
price and supply equals demand. This outcome optimizes
social welfare given ﬁxed productive resources. Under com-
petition, the following conditions are necessary to guarantee
that the market clears at the short-run optimal point: (i) market
liquidity is high, (ii) prosumers are price takers with strictly
increasing marginal costs/strictly decreasing marginal beneﬁt
functions and (iii) prices are publicly available. 
Deﬁnition II.2 A long-run/investment-efﬁcient market equi-
librium guarantees that the right (i.e., cost-minimizing) in-
vestments in production capacity have been made, and long-
run social welfare has been maximized. Besides fulﬁlment of
conditions (i)–(iii), this requires that (iv) there are no barriers
for new competitors to enter and exit the market. 
Note that in the above deﬁnitions, short-run/long-run refer
to the completion of distinct market processes (that is, dis-
patch/investment planning, respectively) rather than to differ-
ent time scales. Moreover, they relate to energy market efﬁ-
ciency in general rather than to the efﬁciency of transmission
system operation and expansion. These aspects have signiﬁcant
inﬂuence on the fulﬁllment of conditions (i)–(iv) and thus on
market performance, as is illustrated in Sect. III–IV.
A. Ahead markets and uncertainty
The operation of the electrical power grid, and thus the
design of competitive markets for electricity, is complicated
by signiﬁcant physical restrictions. A lack of efﬁcient storage
mechanisms requires supply to meet ﬂuctuations in demand
all the time, whereas ﬁnite transmission-line capacities pose
strict constraints on electrical power transmission.
Because of electricity’s time-critical nature, real-time trad-
ing of energy (that is, trade for instantaneous delivery) is
difﬁcult. Instead, the bulk of electrical energy [MWh] is traded
on forward markets such as the day-ahead market, i.e., the
Power Exchange (PX), where suppliers aim to maximize their
proﬁt while taking care of their expected internal energy
balance (supply + demand + exchange = 0). Together with
long-term contracts and bilateral transactions, the PX outcome
shapes the energy exchange schedules for the next operational
day. Accordingly, all ahead-established energy transactions
exist on paper only, as they deﬁne contracts to buy speciﬁc
quantities of energy at a speciﬁed price with the supply set
at a speciﬁed period in the future. There is no direct relation
with the actual, TSO-monitored state of the electricity grid.
During real-time operation, grid users are unavoidably
confronted with the physical limitations of electrical power
and energy. As a result of imperfect predictions, the ahead-
established transactions will deviate from the actual supply
and demand of energy, and unscheduled or infeasible power
ﬂows need to be counteracted immediately, to prevent network
overloading. It is thus crucial for TSOs to design ahead-market
schemes that are both as accurate and robust as possible, to
minimize the need for real-time (fast and expensive) control
Fig. 1. The IEEE 39-bus New England test system.
effort, see, e.g., [4]. When market-based congestion man-
agement is the main focus, these methods should maximize
social welfare while simultaneously taking limited network
capacity and uncertainty of supply/demand into account. In the
next section, we will discuss methods for a-priori congestion
management in detail.
III. CONGESTION MANAGEMENT
We begin by introducing the power system modeling
framework that is used throughout this paper. Let graph
G = (V,E,A) describe a transmission network, where
V = {v1, . . . , vn} is a set of nodes/buses, E ⊆ V × V is
a set of undirected edges/bus interconnections, and A is a
weighted adjacency matrix. The interconnection between bus
vi and vj is denoted by eij = (vi, vj). The adjacency matrix
A ∈ Rn×n satisﬁes [A]ij = −bij = 0 ⇔ eij ∈ E and
[A]ij = 0 ⇔ eij ∈ E, where bij [Ω−1] is the susceptance of
the line(s) associated with edge eij , see [1]. Self-connecting
edges are not allowed (i.e., eii /∈ E), such that A has zeros on
its main diagonal. The set of neighbors of a node vi ∈ V is
denoted by Ni := {vj ∈ V | (vi, vj) ∈ E}; the corresponding
indices are I(Ni) := {j | vj ∈ Ni}. With each eij ∈ E, we
associate a symmetric power-ﬂow limit pij = pji.
The concepts discussed in this paper are illustrated using
the widely-used IEEE 39-bus New England test system. Fig. 1
depicts the corresponding network topology, including price-
elastic generators and price-inelastic loads. Line susceptance
and load values for the network can be found in [5].
A. The optimal power ﬂow problem
In conventional, regulated electrical power systems, the pro-
ductive resources are owned by a small number of cooperating
operators, such that power production can be scheduled in a
centralized fashion, by solving an optimal power ﬂow (OPF)
problem. The OPF problem is instrumental to many market-
based congestion management schemes and is used to derive
the LMP scheme later on.
To deﬁne the OPF problem, with each bus vi ∈ V we
associate a singlet pˆi [MW] and a quadruplet (pi, pi, pi, Ji),
where pi, pi, pi, pˆi ∈ R, pi < pi and Ji : R → R is a
strictly convex, differentiable cost function. The values pi and
pˆi denote the reference values for power injections at each
node into the network. Both pi and pˆi can take positive as
well as negative values, denoting production and consumption,
respectively; the only difference is that in contrast to pˆi, the
value pi has an associated cost/beneﬁt function Ji [e] and
an interconnector capacity constraint p
i
≤ pi ≤ pi. We will
thus refer to pi as the power from a price-elastic prosumer,
and to pˆi as the power from a price-inelastic prosumer. In
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the case of a positive pi, the function Ji represents the
variable costs of production, while for negative values of
pi, it denotes the negated beneﬁt of a consumer. Marginal
production costs/beneﬁts are denoted by ∇Ji [e/MW].
A lossless “DC power ﬂow” model is employed to describe
the power ﬂows in the network for given nodal power in-
jections. Under certain reasonable assumptions, this model is
proven to be a relatively accurate approximation of the more
complex “AC power ﬂow” model, see, for instance, [1]. In
particular, convexity of the DC power ﬂow constraints is a
crucial property that is exploited. With δi [rad] denoting the
voltage phase angle at node vi, the power ﬂow in line eij ∈ E
is given by pij = bij(δi − δj) = −pji. If pij > 0, power
in the line eij ﬂows from node vi to node vj . The power
balance in a node yields pi + pˆi =
∑
j∈I(Ni) pij . With p :=
col(p1, . . . , pn), pˆ := col(pˆ1, . . . , pˆn), δ := col(δ1, . . . , δn)
and 1n := [ 1,...,1 ]
 ∈ Rn, the overall network balance
condition is p + pˆ = Bδ, where B := A − diag(A1n). The
OPF problem is deﬁned as follows.
Problem III.1 Optimal power ﬂow problem
For any constant value of pˆ ∈ Rn,
minimizep,δ
∑n
i=1
Ji(pi) (1a)
subject to p−Bδ + pˆ = 0, (1b)
p ≤ p ≤ p, (1c)
bij(δi − δj) ≤ pij , ∀(i, j ∈ I(Ni)), (1d)
where p = col(p
1
, . . . , p
n
), p = col(p1, . . . , pn). 
We will refer to a vector p∗ that solves the OPF problem as
a vector of optimal power injections.
B. Locational pricing
Solving the OPF problem is one of the major operational
(short-run) goals in a regulated power system. For liberalized,
market-based power systems, the OPF problem is important
due to its relation to the optimal nodal price problem (and
similar LMP schemes) that is deﬁned next.
In a market-based power system, different units are owned
by separate parties and each of them acts autonomously to
maximize its proﬁt given the time-varying price for electricity.
In other words, when a price-elastic unit at node i receives
the price for a certain period in the future, i.e. λi [e/MW], it
adjusts its scheduled prosumption pi to
p˜i = Υi(λi) := argminpi∈[pi,pi]Ji(pi)− λipi, (2)
where λipi−Ji(pi) is the proﬁt/surplus of this particular unit.
Since Ji is a strictly convex function, the relation Υi : R →
[p
i
, pi] deﬁnes a unique mapping from λi to p˜i for any λi ∈ R.
For convenience, let Υ(λ) := col(Υ1(λ1), . . . ,Υn(λn)). Note
that if the capacity constraint pi ∈ [pi, pi] is ignored, it holds
that λi = ∇Ji(p˜i); since prosumers are price-takers/consider
the price as given, they adjust prosumption until the corre-
sponding marginal cost ∇Ji(pi) equals the nodal price λi.
The foregoing shows that in a deregulated power system, the
TSO cannot directly adjust nodal power injections to achieve a
certain objective, e.g., to prevent congestion. Instead, it should
TABLE I
GENERATOR PARAMETERS
Bus i ci bi Bus i ci bi
30 0.8 30.00 35 0.8 34.80
31 0.7 35.99 36 1.0 34.40
32 0.7 35.45 37 0.8 35.68
33 0.8 34.94 38 0.8 33.36
34 0.8 35.94 39 0.6 34.00
provide market participants with price-based incentives for
supporting such a system-wide goal. The operational goal in
a nodal-pricing based power system is to determine the nodal
price λi for each node i in the network, in such a way that
short-run social welfare is maximized, while fulﬁlling both
balance and network constraints. This optimal nodal pricing
(ONP) problem is deﬁned as follows.
Problem III.2 Optimal nodal prices problem
For any constant value of pˆ ∈ Rn,
minimizeλ,δ
∑n
i=1
Ji(Υi(λi)) (3a)
subject to Υ(λ)−Bδ + pˆ = 0 (3b)
bij(δi − δj) ≤ pij , ∀(i, j ∈ I(Ni)). (3c)
where λ = col(λ1, . . . , λn) is a vector of nodal prices. 
We will refer to a vector λ∗ that solves the ONP problem
with the term vector of optimal nodal prices. The OPF and
ONP problems are related through Lagrange duality (see, e.g.,
[6]). It thus holds that Υ(λ∗) = p∗, i.e., both problems
implicitly deﬁne the vector of optimal nodal power injections
that maximizes short-run social welfare.
In ONP-operated networks, the nodal price of electricity at
a given time instant and bus reﬂects the least expensive way to
increase the power ﬂow to that particular node from the on-line
generators while respecting all network constraints and system
limits. Consequently, prices are identical throughout the net-
work only if the transmission system has inﬁnite capacity, or
if OPF outcome p∗ yields no congestion. In the latter case,
the network constraints have no effect on the forward market.
In what follows, we illustrate the nodal pricing concept
using the New England test network. For this, the cost
functions associated with the price-elastic generators at buses
i = 30, . . . , 39 are parameterized as Ji(pi) = 12cip
2
i + bipi,
with ci, bi ∈ R, yielding afﬁne marginal costs or bids
∇Ji(pi) = cipi + bi. The values for ci and bi are listed in
Table I. All generator capacity limits are set to p
i
= 0, pi = 10
(per unit, base value 100MW). For simplicity, pij was set
to inﬁnite for all transmission lines, except for e25,26. Fig. 2
shows the nodal prices for an uncongested (dashed line) and
a congested (bars) network scenario, obtained by solving
Prob. III.2 for p25,26 = ∞ and p25,26 = 1.5, respectively. The
corresponding optimal power injections are given in Table II.
The unconstrained scenario yields p25,26 = 2.2326 > 1.5. In
the constrained scenario, only the power ﬂow between node
25 to 26 is limited, yet trade is affected at all buses. This
effect is typical for highly-interconnected meshed networks
such as the 39-bus system. The constrained scenario leads to
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Fig. 2. Optimal nodal prices for an uncongested and a congested scenario.
TABLE II
OPTIMAL NODAL POWER INJECTIONS
p25,26 {p∗30, . . . , p∗39}
∞ {10.0, 4.70, 5.47, 5.43, 4.18, 5.60, 4.88, 4.50, 7.40, 8.80}
1.5 {10.0, 4.54, 5.35, 5.56, 4.31, 5.74, 4.99, 3.72, 8.43, 8.33}
21 price areas, i.e., 21 clusters of buses with uniform nodal
prices. This division of the network in price areas (or zones)
is not static, but completely determined by the parameters of
the ONP problem (such as the time-dependent bids ∇Ji).
The 39-bus example shows that transmission-line restric-
tions may have varying effects on the nodal prices throughout
the network. Congested lines do not support additional power
ﬂow, such that speciﬁc nodes (e.g., bus 38 in the simulation)
can be cut off from the cheapest supplier in the network, which
results in an increased nodal price (if the unconstrained market
is taken as reference). Other prosumers (such as the ones at
bus 25) can beneﬁt from congestion, as the least expensive
supply is distributed among a smaller number of accessible
consumers. Still, since transmission-line restrictions narrow
the domain over which the market is optimized, congestion
always increases short-run cost while decreasing welfare. In
the above simulation, for instance, if pi,j = ∞ for all lines, the
optimized cost J(p∗) and social welfare
∑n
i=1 λ
∗
i p
∗
i − Ji(p∗i )
amount to e2227.50 and e167.5423, respectively, whereas the
constrained scenario yields an optimal cost and welfare of
e2228.28 and e165.7812, respectively.
As indicated by the example, transmission constraints can
provide prosumers at badly accessible network locations with
market power. If exercised, this power can result in non-
optimal local prices and market inefﬁciency. Adequate reg-
ulation of the TSO is therefore crucial to ensure that the op-
eration and expansion of the transmission network contribute
to welfare maximization, see Sect. IV.
C. Curative congestion management
LMP methods such as ONP explicitly confront market par-
ticipants with network limitations, that is, with constraint (3c),
during the ahead-trading stage. Consequently, when supply
and demand bids ∇Ji(pi) have been exchanged with the
market, the optimal nodal prices for the next operational day
can be computed in a single optimization run.
However, in practice, such preventive congestion manage-
ment methods, i.e., methods that are employed before gate
closure, may not be sufﬁcient to guarantee satisfaction of
security criteria during the operational day, see, e.g., [7]. Due
to unexpected ﬂuctuations in generation and load, or due to
contingencies such as transmission-line faults, security criteria
can be violated even if the market takes reasonable safety
margins into account. Moreover, to limit the number of price
areas in Europe, preventive methods currently only consider a
subset of transmission restrictions. In contrast to ONP, where
the clustering of buses with uniform prices may vary over time
and is determined by the congested lines, the European energy
market relies on a-priori ﬁxed price areas (usually deﬁned by
political borders), within which Prob. III.2 is solved while
ignoring internal transmission constraints.
TSOs can reduce the inter-area congestion risk by adjust-
ing the forward-market’s Available Transfer Capacity (ATC),
which is allocated to market participants on the basis of
periodically held auctions, see [8]. ATC values indicate the
maximum amount of power that can be exchanged by ad-
jacent price areas while ensuring system security. This is a
considerable simpliﬁcation of (3c), and it thus follows that
ATC values are conditional upon the actual network-wide
distribution of power injections. Since the exact nodal power
injections are not known in advance, ATC values have to be
computed based on expected dispatch scenarios. Moreover,
due to the complexity of the European power system and the
uncontrollable nature of electrical power ﬂow, ATC values
are so strongly interdependent that it is only possible to
approximate them in a decentralized fashion.
ATC inaccuracy and intra-area transmission restrictions
render curative congestion management, that is, congestion
redispatch or counter trade after gate closure, indispensable
for safe operation of the European transmission network.
Normally, the TSO is the only buyer of curative counter
transactions (i.e., supplementary transactions to recover secure
network conditions), and their selection is usually based on
merit-order criteria or long-term contracts, see [2]. Although
there are many options for redispatch, here we only describe
cost-based counter trade.
Let Δpi ∈ R and Δδi ∈ R be a power-injection and
voltage-angle adjustment at bus i, measured with respect to
the unconstrained-market outcome pPXi , δ
PX
i ∈ R. Suppose that
elastic prosumers provide the TSO with knowledge of their
adjustment cost/beneﬁt, in the form of strictly convex functions
JCTi : R → R. Then, the cost-based intra-area congestion-
redispatch procedure is formally deﬁned as follows.
Problem III.3 Curative congestion management
1. The market solves Prob. III.2 while ignoring (3c) to ﬁnd
the uniform price vector λ¯PX = col(λPX, . . . , λPX) ∈ Rn, i.e.,(
λ¯PX, δPX
)
:= argmin{λ,δ s.t. (3b)}
∑n
i=1Ji(Υi(λi)).
2. If pPX := Υ(λ¯PX) and δPX violate (3c), the TSO employs
congestion redispatch:
minimizeΔp,Δδ
∑n
i=1J
CT
i (Δpi) (4a)
subject to Δp−BΔδ = 0 (4b)
bij(δPXi + Δδi − δPXj −Δδj) ≤ pij , (4c)
for all (i, j ∈ I(Ni)), where Δp := col(Δp1, . . . ,Δpn) and
Δδ := col(Δδ1, . . . ,Δδn).
3. Given optimal redispatch vector Δp∗, the TSO pays
JCTi (Δp
∗
i ) to prosumer i as an incentive for adjusting its power
injection to pPXi + Δp
∗
i . 
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Next, suppose that the cost functions Ji and capacities pi, pi
are time invariant1. Then, it holds that
JCTi (Δpi) =
{
Ji(p
PX
i + Δpi)− Ji(pPXi ), Δpi ∈ [Δpi,Δpi]
∞, Δpi /∈ [Δp
i
,Δpi]
(5)
for all i, where Δp
i
:= p
i
− pPXi and Δpi := pi− pPXi . In this
case, prosumers that are constrained on, i.e., increase produc-
tion/decrease consumption, are exactly compensated for their
increased variable cost/decreased variable beneﬁt, whereas
prosumers that are constrained off are ﬁnancially indifferent
between producing pPXi and participating in redispatch by
reducing production with Δp∗i
2.
Now consider the following proposition.
Proposition III.4 Let (5) hold. Then, Prob. III.2 and
Prob. III.3 (i) deﬁne identical nodal power injections and pro-
sumer costs, but (ii) differ in terms of short-run social welfare.
Proof. (i) From (5) and the construction of pPXi , δ
PX
i ,Δp
∗
i
and Δδ∗i , it straightforwardly follows that p
PX + Δp∗ and
δPX +Δδ∗ solve the OPF problem. Thus, the power injections
and angles deﬁned by Prob. III.3 satisfy pPXi + Δp
∗
i = p
∗
i
and Ji(pPXi ) + J
CT
i (Δp
∗
i ) = Ji(p
PX
i + Δp
∗
i ) = Ji(p
∗
i ) for
all i. (ii) In case of ONP/Prob. III.2, the income and cost
of the producers (or, equivalently, the cost and beneﬁt of the
consumers) at node i equal λ∗i p
∗
i and Ji(p
∗
i ), respectively,
whereas in case of Prob. III.3, the producer income and cost
amount to λPXpPXi +J
CT
i (Δp
∗
i ) and Ji(p
∗
i ), respectively. Thus,
the social welfare is
∑n
i=1{λ∗i p∗i − Ji(p∗i )} for ONP and∑n
i=1{λPXpPXi − Ji(pPXi )} for cost-based redispatch. These
values are not identical, except for pPX = p∗. 
Next, we describe a simple curative counter transaction
for the 39-bus test network to illustrate the above result
and its consequences for the TSO. Recall from Sect. III-B
that the optimal vector of nodal power injections for the
unconstrained market (corresponding to λPX = 39.2817,
see Table II) violates the transmission-line constraints. The
TSO can ask market participants what compensation they are
willing to accept to adjust their prosumption in such a way
that the power balance is maintained and the ﬂow p25,26 is
lowered to p25,26 = 1.5. These conditions are met, e.g., if
the generators at buses 37 and 38 decrease and increase their
power injections with 0.7326, respectively. Since the generator
at node 37 reduces its production with respect to pPX37 , it pays
J37(pPX37 )−J37(pPX37−0.7326) = e41.6527 to the TSO, whereas
the TSO pays J38(pPX38 + 0.7326)− J38(pPX38 ) = e42.5723 for
increasing the generation at bus 38. Thus, the cost associated
with this pair of bilateral transactions is e0.9195.
Under assumption (5), it can be shown that there is no
other feasible pair of bilateral transactions that yields lower
1This assumption is nontrivial: depending on the generators and the time
frame involved, cost functions and capacities will generally change over time.
Consider for instance start/stop times that are irrelevant during forward trade,
but that prevent redispatch of the corresponding sources after gate closure.
2Note that a small ε [e] term may be added to JCTi (Δpi) to provide
prosumers with a strictly positive incentive for redispatch.
redispatch costs than the one described above. However, if the
selection of counter transactions is not limited to a subset of
the generators, the overall prosumption costs can be lowered
to those of the OPF solution (without affecting short-run
social welfare, which is e167.5423 regardless of the redis-
patch), yielding minimum costs for the TSO, i.e., e0.7758.
Still, by construction, a constrained market (e.g., Prob. III.2)
cannot outperform the corresponding unconstrained market
(e.g., Prob. III.2 without constraints (3c)), such that the TSO
generally suffers losses from counter trade. In case of efﬁcient
behavior, the TSO can usually socialize and recover these con-
gestion redispatch costs via a system-wide transmission tariff.
Note that this is in contrast to ONP-based networks, where
the forward market price may be non-uniform and explicitly
confronts prosumers, without intervention by the TSO, with
both energy and location-speciﬁc transmission costs.
IV. MARKET EFFICIENCY AND NETWORK SECURITY
Since Prob. III.2 implicitly deﬁnes the vector of power
injections that maximizes short-term social welfare, one might
conclude that ONP, and, at best, also OPF-based redispatch,
lead to a dispatch efﬁcient market equilibrium. However,
since the vector of optimal power injections p∗ is a function
of network parameters B and pij , it is hard to draw ﬁrm
conclusions on dispatch efﬁciency without analyzing how
these network parameters are obtained. B, pij and ATC values
are stochastic variables, and only the TSO has sufﬁcient
information to predict their value in a reliable fashion3. Since
the TSO has a natural monopoly on transmission, regulation
is required to avoid possible abuse of his powerful position
in the market. The monitoring of line-susceptance prediction
quality is straightforward, as real-time measurements allow
for a-posteriori comparison with the TSO’s expectations. This
is not the case for transfer-capacity (or ATC) proﬁles, which
consist of both estimated thermal transmission-line limits and
safety margins that are selected at the TSO’s discretion.
The above described non-transparency provides network op-
erators with the possibility to exploit ﬂow-capacity estimation
in their own beneﬁt, see, e.g., [9]. Naturally, TSOs tend to
minimize the chance of network overloading by choosing se-
curity margins as large as possible, whereas prosumers demand
maximum transmission capacity, i.e., minimum margins, to
optimize social welfare. In what follows, we provide a way to
model this trade-off between conﬂicting short-run security and
market efﬁciency objectives as a multiobjective optimization
problem, see for instance [10].
Let fij [MW] and Δfij [MW] be the thermal limit (deter-
mined by external factors such as weather conditions) and
the security margin (set by the TSO) of transmission line eij ,
respectively, such that pij := fij − Δfij . Note that 0 ≤ fij
and 0 ≤ Δfij ≤ fij . Next, let f := col({fij | eij ∈ E})
and Δf := col({Δfij | eij ∈ E}), and consider an objective
function S(Δf) [C] that represents the TSO’s ﬁnancial risk of
3Note that also in the long-run, the TSO is the only market actor able to
adjust B and pij by investing in the transmission infrastructure.
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congestion, overloading and line outages/damage associated
with a particular set of safety margins Δf . For simplic-
ity, assume that S(Δf) is decreasing in all Δfij , and that
S(Δf) → 0 if Δfij → fij for all (i, j ∈ I(Ni)). Moreover,
let J(p) :=
∑n
i=1 Ji(pi) [C] map the vector of nodal power
injections p ∈ Rn to the corresponding total prosumption
cost/beneﬁt. Now consider the following problem.
Problem IV.1 Power system security/efﬁciency trade-off
For any constant value of pˆ and f ,
min
Δf,λ,δ
[
S(Δf) J(Υ(λ))
]
(6)
subject to 0 ≤ Δf ≤ f , (3b)-(3c), where pij := fij−Δfij . 
Multiobjective optimization problems such as the one above
have an inﬁnite number of solutions, as there are inﬁnite ways
to trade off two or more conﬂicting goals. A feasible point
(Δf∗, λ∗, δ∗) lies within the solution space of Prob. IV.1 if
and only if it is Pareto optimal, i.e., if all points corresponding
to lower security costs S (or lower prosumption cost J) yield
larger J (or S). One way to solve Prob. IV.1 is to construct a
single composite objective function C(Δf, λ) := rS(Δf) +
J(Υ(λ)), with positive scalar weight r ∈ R, and solve
min
Δf,λ,δ
C(Δf, λ) (7)
subject to 0 ≤ Δf ≤ f , (3b) and (3c). Each outcome of the
composite optimization problem corresponds to a particular
trade-off that is characterized by r. Thus, the full set of
solutions (i.e., the trade-off surface/Pareto frontier) is found
by evaluating (7) for all r ∈ [0,∞).
In what follows, we illustrate the above concept with the
39-bus network. For simplicity, let pij be inﬁnite for all lines
except e25,26, and let S(Δf) := (Δf25,26 − f25,26)2, where
f25,26 = 1.5. Fig. 3 shows the resulting Pareto frontier in
the J(·), S(·) plane. Clearly, minimal network costs S(Δf)
are attained for r → ∞. This ratio corresponds to a secu-
rity/efﬁciency trade-off that is completely in favor of the TSO
(i.e., line e25,26 is not loaded at all). Social welfare, on the
other hand, is maximized for r = 0, in which case Δf25,26 = 0
and transmission risks are high.
Fig. 3 shows that r can have signiﬁcant effects on mar-
ket and system performance. The regulator can choose any
positive value for r that is in accordance with (inter)national
legislation, to trade off security against market efﬁciency in
a way that best ﬁts his priorities. As an example of a point
of operation that the regulator can pursue, we mention the
egalitarian solution P , see [10]. A power system is operated
in an egalitarian fashion if the regulator appreciates system
safety and market performance to an equal extent, yielding
an outcome of Prob. IV.1 that satisﬁes ddrS(Δf
∗(r)) =
− ddrJ(p∗(r)). As shown in Fig. 3, the egalitarian solution of
Prob. IV.1 is the point P = (S(·), J(·)) where the tangent to
the Pareto frontier has a slope dSdJ of −1.
The above modeling framework provides a transparent way
to decouple and analyze the effects of TSO behavior, prosumer
bids and network regulation on short-run market efﬁciency,
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Fig. 3. Security/efﬁciency Pareto front for the 39-bus example network.
independent of the applied congestion management scheme.
Moreover, it explicitly associates network reliability (measured
in terms of line margins Δf ) with the expected costs for
the network operator. Note that even though it is difﬁcult
to predict network security costs a priori, there are many
observation-based methods for approximating them empiri-
cally, see, e.g., [11] and the references therein.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, the differences between locational pricing and
cost-based congestion redispatch were analyzed, followed by
an assessment of their effects on grid operation. It was shown
that although optimal nodal pricing and cost-based congestion
redispatch yield identical power injections, they are not equiv-
alent in terms of social welfare. Moreover, a multiobjective
modeling framework was presented to decouple and analyze
the effects of TSO/regulator and prosumer behavior on short-
run power system security and market efﬁciency.
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